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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-RETROACTIVE .APPLICATION OF UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INcoME ACT-The trustee of a trust created prior to
the 1957 enactment of the Uniform Principal and Income Act1 petitioned
for instructions as to whether a stock dividend received by it subsequent
to the passage of the act should be allocated to principal or income. The
Uniform Act provides a rule for the treatment of stock dividends contrary
to the judicial rule previously adopted in Wisconsin, and is expressly made
applicable to trusts existing on its date of enactment.2 The county court,
finding the act could not be constitutionally applied to trusts created prior
to its enactment, ordered the allocation of the shares to income. On appeal,
held, reversed. The application of the Uniform Principal and Income Act
to stock dividends received subsequent to the passage of the act by a trust
created prior to the act does not violate Fourteenth Amendment due
process. In re Allis Will, (Wis. 1959) 94 N.W. (2d) 226.
Two major competing rules have developed on the question whether
extraordinary stock dividends received by a trust are to be treated as principal or income.3 The so-called Pennsylvania rule treats such dividends as
principal only to the extent that they are declared out of funds earned by
the declaring corporation prior to the creation of the trust.4 The Massachusetts rule simply regards all stock dividends as principal.I> Wisconsin,
previously committed by judicial decision to the Pennsylvania rule, 6 has
now substituted the Massachusetts rule by adopting the Uniform Principal

1 Wis.

Stat. Ann. (1957; Supp. 1958) §231.40.
§231.40 (12)
ed., §236.3 (1956). A third general rule known as
the Kentucky rule, which allocated all extraordinary dividends to income, was abandoned
in Kentucky in :Bowles v. Stilley's Executor, (Ky. 1954) 267 S.W. (2d) 707, and has little
following elsewhere. An annotation discussing the general rules may be found in 44
A.L.R. (2d) 1277 (1955).
4 3 Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., p. 1813 (1956). See, e.g., Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450,
103 N.E. 723 (1913); :Baldwin v. :Baldwin, 159 Md. 175, 150 A. 282 (1930).
5 See, e.g., Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868). The current trend is now away from
the once-favored Pennsylvania rule toward the more easily administered Massachusetts
rule. 3 Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., p. 1814 (1956). The Pennsylvania rule was originally accepted by the American Law Institute in TRusrs R.EsrATEMENT §236 (1935), but this has
since been changed to the Massachusetts rule. TRusrs R.EsrATEMENT §236 (Supp. 1948).
6 Soehnlein v. Soehnlein, 146 Wis. 330, 131 N.W. 739 (1911).
2 Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957; Supp. 1958)
3 See, generally, 3 Scarr, TRusrs, 2d

1959]

R.EcENT DECISIONS

283

and Income Act.7 The Wisconsin legislature altered the Uniform Act by
expressly providing that it should apply to trusts created prior to its enactment,s thereby avoiding the situation present in several jurisdictions
requiring the continued maintenance and development of the pre-statutory
rule for application to trusts created prior to the statute.9 The principal
case, by sustaining the retroactive application of the Uniform Act, goes
against a series of Pennsylvania decisions,10 the only other authority directly
on point. The Pennsylvania court has held that the income beneficiary
acquires a vested interest in the trust income as determined by the allocation rules applicable at the trust's creation. The retroactive application of
the new rule is therefore held unconstitutional under the classic doctrine that
retroactive interference with vested rights violates due process.11 In comparing the relative merits of these decisions the question would simply
seem, at first glance, to be which court uses the correct meaning of vested
right. But the classic definition,1 2 phrased in natural law terminology,13
only begs the question.14 The ambiguous and indefinite nature of the con7 The Massachusetts rule is found in §5 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act,
which has now been adopted in 21 states. A list of these may be found in 9B UNIFORM
LAws ANNOTATED 365 (1957).
s Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957; Supp. 1958) §231.40 (12). Section 17 of the Uniform Act
makes the act applicable only to estates becoming legally effective after its enactment.
Pennsylvania appears to be the only other jurisdiction making the act so applicable. Pa.
Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930; Supp. 1958) tit. 20, §3470.15. Connecticut has simply omitted
this section entirely. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958) §45-II0 to §45•ll9.
9 See, e.g., In re Wehrane's Estate, 41 N.J. Super. 158, 124 A. (2d) 334 (1956); Jones
Estate, 377 Pa. 473, 105 A. (2d) 353 (1954); Estate of Heard, 107 Cal. App. (2d) 225, 236
P. (2d) 810 (1951); Matter of Hagen, 262 N.Y. 301, 186 N.E. 792 (1933).
10 Crawford Estate, 362 Pa. 458, 67 A. (2d) 124 (1949); Pew Trust, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A.
(2d) 129 (1949); Warden Trust, 382 Pa. 3ll, ll5 A. (2d) 159 (1955); Steele Estate, 377
Pa. 250, 103 A. (2d) 409 (1954); Jones Estate, note 9 supra. The Crawford case was cited
as authority in In re Fera's Estate, 26 N.J. 131, 139 A. (2d) 23 (1958), taking the position
that the New Jersey Principal and Income Act was not retroactively applicable. However, the New Jersey statute does not by its terms apply to trusts created prior to its
enactment. N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) §3A:14A-9. The Pennsylvania decisions are criticized
in Ives, "Allocating Stock Dividends," 91 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 851 (1952); comment, 29
TEMPLE L. Q. 224 (1956).
11 See, generally, ROTISCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-549 (1939).
12 "(T]he term 'vested rights' is not used in any narrow or technical sense, or as importing a power of legal control merely, but rather as implying a vested interest which it
is right and equitable that the government should recognize and protect, and of which the
individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without injustice." 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 745 (1927).
13 Early cases suggested that retroactive legislation could be voided without respect to
any express constitutional prohibition, either on the ground it violated principles of
"eternal justice," Denson v. Mayor, etc. of New York, IO Darb. (N.Y.) 223 (1850), or because it exceeded some inherent limitation on legislative power, Dunbarton v. Franklin,
19 N.H. 257 (1848). On the influence of the natural law on the question of the validity
of retroactive legislation, see Smead, "The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Dasie
Principle of Jurisprudence," 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936).
14 "When it is said that the legislature ought not to deprive parties of their 'vested
rights,' all that is meant is this: that the rights styled vested are sacred or inviolable, or
are such as the parties ought not to be deprived of by the legislature. Like a thousand
other propositions, which sound speciously to the ear, it is either purely identical and
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cept has led most commentators to conclude that the vested rights analysis is
little more than a method of rationalizing decisions already reached on some
other ground.111 Any examination of these decisions must therefore go
beneath the conclusory vested rights label to a more fundamental due
process analysis which balances the legislative objectives in making the
statute retroactive against the need for protecting some existing interest
arising under the old rule. The basic disagreement between the courts is
on the question whether the income beneficiary has any interest, be it called
vested or otherwise, which requires the court's protection. In holding that
he does not, the Wisconsin court relies on the premise that unless he expressly states otherwise the settlor is presumed to intend that the allocation
of stock dividends should be governed by the rules effective when they are
received.16 Since the settlor's intent governs the extent of the beneficiary's
interest the retroactive application of the statute deprives him of nothing
substantial.1 7 This presumption was similarly used in a recent Kentucky
decision holding that judicial adoption of the Massachusetts rule could be
given retroactive effect notwithstanding the fact it reversed the prior contrary rule.18 The presumption of intent seems reasonable, particularly
where, as the court in the principal case points out,1 9 the social desirability
of the rule in effect at the creation of the trust is the subject of considerable
divergence of opinion.2 0 The Pennsylvania rule creates a rigidity which
in all probability the settlor never desired. The Wisconsin court by using
the presumption of intent obviates consideration of whether the beneficiary's interest is sufficiently important to require the invalidation of a statute
supported by sound considerations of legislative policy. The Pennsylvania
court, on the other hand, makes its finding that the beneficiary has a property interest determinative of the whole due process question. Its approach
tells us nothing, or begs the question in issue.•••" 2 AusnN, JURISl'RUDENCE, 5th ed.,
856 (1885).
15 Smead, "The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence," 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936); Smith, "Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights," 5
Tux. L. REv. 231 (1927), 6 TEX. L. REv. 409 (1928); comment, 44 YALE L. J. 358 (1934).
16 Principal case at 231-232. This is a variation of the generally accepted rule that
unless a settlor expresses some other desire, he is presumed to intend that the legality of
his trustee's investments should be determined by the law in effect when the investment is
made. 3 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., p. 1697 (1956).
17 On this same ground it is generally held that statutes establishing the investments
a trustee may legally make with trust funds can be constitutionally applied to trusts
created prior to their enactment. See, e.g., Goodridge v. National Bank of Commerce of
Norfolk, (Va. 1959) 106 S.E. (2d) 598; Mechanicks National Bank of Concord v. Brady, 100
N.H. 469, 129 A. (2d) 857 (1957); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price, 11 N.J. 90, 93 A. (2d)
321 (1952); 35 A.L.R. (2d) 991 (1954).
18 Farmers Bank & Capital Trust Co. v. Hulette, (Ky. 1956) 293 S.W. (2d) 458, holding that the Massachusetts rule, adopted in Bowles v. Stilley's Executor, note 3 supra,
could be applied to a trust created prior to the Bowles decision, notwithstanding the fact
the earlier Kentucky rule would have brought a different result.
19 Principal case at 231.
20 For a discussion of the relative merits of each rule, see 3 SCO'IT, TRUSTS, 2d ed., pp.
1817-1821 (1956).

1959]

RECENT DECISIONS

285

is therefore subject to the additional criticism that it does not conform to

the traditional due process balancing of interests analysis, under which
property rights may be impaired if legislative objectives in doing so are
sufficiently strong and if the property invasion is not too great.21 One
writer has suggested the Pennsylvania approach in these decisions may be
acceptable because in the adoption of dividend allocation rules no legislative purpose is advanced by applying the statute to existing interests.22
But the desirability of freeing courts and multiple trustees from the necessity of dealing with two sets of complex rules presents such a purpose. That
purpose should govern in the absence of a substantial reason for denying it.

Thomas E. Kauper, S.Ed.

21 See SCURLOCK, R.EmoACTlVE LEGISLATION AFFEcnNG lNTEREsTs IN LAND, c. 2 (1953);
Greenblatt, "Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation," 51 N.W. UNIV. L.
R.Ev. 540 (1956). It should be noted, however, as both Scurlock and Greenblatt point out,
tbis one-sided approach is not uncommon, particularly where interests in land are concerned.
22 Greenblatt, "Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation," 51 N.W. UNIV.
L. R.Ev. 540 at 562 (1956).

